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Abstract
Our experiences can blind us. Once we have learned to solve problems by one method, we often have difficulties in
generating solutions involving a different kind of insight. Yet there is evidence that people with brain lesions are sometimes
more resistant to this so-called mental set effect. This inspired us to investigate whether the mental set effect can be
reduced by non-invasive brain stimulation. 60 healthy right-handed participants were asked to take an insight problem
solving task while receiving transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to the anterior temporal lobes (ATL). Only 20% of
participants solved an insight problem with sham stimulation (control), whereas 3 times as many participants did so
(p=0.011) with cathodal stimulation (decreased excitability) of the left ATL together with anodal stimulation (increased
excitability) of the right ATL. We found hemispheric differences in that a stimulation montage involving the opposite
polarities did not facilitate performance. Our findings are consistent with the theory that inhibition to the left ATL can lead
to a cognitive style that is less influenced by mental templates and that the right ATL may be associated with insight or
novel meaning. Further studies including neurophysiological imaging are needed to elucidate the specific mechanisms
leading to the enhancement.
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Introduction
Thinking outside the box is difficult. And counter-intuitively,
those with the most in-depth knowledge do not have an advantage
in this pursuit [1]. In fact, as Kuhn [2] noted, ‘‘almost always the
men who achieve these fundamental inventions have been either
very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they change.’’
One possible explanation for this paradox is that our mind is
hypothesis driven [3,4]. In other words, our observations of the
world are strongly shaped by our preconceptions. For example,
information consistent with our expectations or mental templates
is often accepted at face value, whereas inconsistent evidence is
discounted or hidden from conscious awareness [5]. While this
hypothesis driven mechanism helps us in efficiently dealing with
the familiar, it can prevent us from seeing better solutions in a
different and/or unfamiliar context [6].
Presumably,itwouldbe beneficialincertainsituationsifwecould
temporarily induce a state of mind that is less top-down, in other
words, less influenced by mental templates or preconceptions.
Interestingly, a clue for achieving this comes from people with brain
dysfunctions [7,8]. For example, Miller et al. [9] found that artistic
talent, due to a different way of perceiving the world, can sometimes
emerge spontaneously in those with dominant (usually left) anterior
temporal lobe dementia. They argued that damage to this area may
interrupt certain inhibitory mechanisms in the left hemisphere and
disinhibit contralateral areas in the right. As an oversimplified
caricature, brain dysfunctions, induced or caused by inhibiting and
disinhibiting certain neural networks, may make our cognitive style
less hypothesis driven, thereby enabling access to a level of
perception normally hidden from conscious awareness [7,8].
This raises a provocative possibility: Can we facilitate insight
problem solving in healthy people by temporarily inhibiting or
disinhibiting certain areas of the brain? To explore this possibility,
we used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (see
Methods), a safe, non-invasive technique that can increase or
decrease cortical excitability and spontaneous neuronal firing in
the stimulated region depending on current polarity [10,11].
Wehypothesized that cathodal stimulation (decreasing excitability)
of the left anterior temporal lobe (ATL) together with anodal
stimulation (increasing excitability) of the right ATL would facilitate
performance on an insight problem solving task. This prediction is
based on evidence that the right ATL is an area associated with
insight [12,13] and novel meaning [14] and that inhibition of the left
ATL is associated with emergence of certain cognitive skills and a less
top-down or hypothesis driven cognitive style [9,15,16,17]. More
generally, it is consistent with evidence that the left hemisphere is
involved in the maintenance of existing hypotheses and representa-
tions [18,19,20,21], while the right hemisphere is associated with
novelty and with updating hypotheses and representations
[22,23,24,25,26]. We elaborate further on this in the Discussion.
Methods
Participants
67 healthy right handed subjects aged between 18 and 38 years
from the University of Sydney participated in our study, with 60
participants included in the final analysis. Individuals with a score
greater than 50 on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory [27]
were eligible for participation. Participants were screened and
excluded if they had any neuropsychiatric disorder, current or past
history of drug use, were taking any medication acting on the
central nervous system or were pregnant.
Of the 67 participants, 5 participants who had previous experience
with the task (matchsticks arithmetic problems) were excluded. 2
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numerals and/or learning our testing protocols were also excluded.
Therefore, after exclusion, data from sixty participants (29 females,
mean age=22, SD=3.9) were used in this study (See Table 1 for
demographic characteristics across the three stimulation groups). All
of these participants were naı ¨ve to tDCS and had no prior experience
with the matchstick insight problem solving task. The study was
carried out to conform to the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki
and was approved by the University of Sydney Human Research
Ethics Committee. All participants gave written informed consent for
the study prior to the experiment.
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS)
tDCS involves applying a weak direct current to the scalp via
two saline-soaked sponge electrodes, thereby polarizing the
underlying brain tissue with electrical fields. It has been shown
that tDCS can modulate cortical excitability and spontaneous
firing activities in the stimulated region by shifting the resting
membrane potential [28]. Depending on the polarity of the
current flow, cortical excitability can be increased (anodal
stimulation) or decreased (cathodal stimulation) during and
beyond the period of stimulation [10,29]. It is an ideal
neuromodulation technique for our purpose because it is safe
and has a particularly effective placebo that blinds subjects from
stimulation conditions [30].
We used a custom made, battery-driven, constant current
stimulator with a maximum output of 2mA and 2 sponge
electrodes each with an area of 35cm2. Our device is particularly
reliable for blinding subjects to stimulation conditions because it
can be set to an ON display even when there is no stimulation (as
in the sham, or control, condition).
For the active stimulation conditions, a constant current of
1.6mA intensity was applied, and was manually and slowly
ramped up and down (over 30 seconds). The current density is
1.6mA/35cm2 which is equal to 0.0457mA/cm2. For the sham
stimulation (control) condition, the sponge electrodes were placed
in the same positions as in active stimulation, but after 30 seconds,
the electrical current was covertly ramped down so that subjects
did not receive further stimulation for the rest of the experiment.
Gandiga et al. [30] suggested that the ‘‘sham stimulation’’
described above can blind subjects from stimulation conditions
since this method produces similar initial tingling sensations in
subjects as active stimulation does. In addition, to ensure that the
blinding would be successful, we chose 1.6mA instead of 2mA as
the intensity for the active conditions. This was based on previous
experiences with tDCS, in which we noted that some participants
felt particularly noticeable tingling sensations when the intensity
was increased above 1.6mA.
We used a between-subjects design in accordance to Ollinger el
al. [31], rather than a repeated measure design, to prevent practice
effects from cofounding our results.
The 60 right handed participants were randomly assigned to
one of three types of stimulation prior to the start of the
experiment: 1) Cathodal stimulation of the left ATL together with
anodal stimulation of the right ATL. This is referred in the text as
the ‘‘L2 R+ stimulation’’ condition. Specifically, the cathode
electrode was placed over at the left ATL, approximately half way
between T7 and FT7 on the International 10–20 System for
electrode placement. The anodal electrode was placed over at the
right ATL, approximately half way between T8 and FT8 on the
same 10–20 System. The area is laterally 40% of the intra-
auricular distance from the vertex and anteriorly 5% of the
distance from inion to nasion. The areas were determined with the
guidance of an EEG cap. 2) Anodal stimulation of the left ATL
together with cathodal stimulation of the right ATL. This is
referred to as the ‘‘L+ R2 stimulation’’. 3) ‘‘Sham stimulation’’ for
control, involving transient, non-effective stimulation in the L2
R+ configuration (i.e. the same placement as in condition 1).
Participants were blind to their stimulation condition.
None of the participants experienced adverse effects as a result
of tDCS or withdrew from the study.
Cognitive task
To assess whether we could facilitate insight, we used a well
known experimental paradigm involving ‘‘matchstick arithmetic’’
[31]. Participants were asked to correct a false arithmetic
statement, presented in Roman numerals constructed from
matchsticks, by moving one stick from one position to another
position without adding or discarding a stick (see figure 1). The
only valid symbols were the Roman numerals ‘I’, ‘V’, ‘X’ and the
arithemetic operators ‘+’, ‘2’ and ‘=’. We followed the procedure
of Ollinger et al. [31] who demonstrated that repeatedly solving
problems requiring one kind of insight (e.g. changing an X to a V
as shown in Type 1 of figure 1) impairs subsequent performance
on problems requiring a different kind of insight (e.g. changing a +
sign to an = sign as shown in Type 2 of figure 1). In fact, they
found that only 10% of participants could solve the Type 2
Table 1. Demographic characteristics across the three
stimulation groups.
Sham L2 R+ L+ R2
Age (years) 21.960.72 23.861.1 21.860.63
Gender (number of females) 14 5 12
Time required in completing
the mental set phase (seconds)
5366186 5556128 442699
Experience in a quantitative field
(number of participants)
Limited 4 6 4
Average 8 9 10
Significant 8 5 6
Values are presented as mean 6 standard error of the mean. Participants across
the three stimulation groups did not differ in terms of age (p=0.19, ANOVA),
time required in completing the mental set phase (p=0.76, ANOVA) or
experience in a quantitative field (p=0.85, 2 tailed Fisher’s exact test). It turned
out that gender is not evenly distributed across the stimulation groups, with a
few more females in the sham stimulation group. Nevertheless, it is clear from
the data that gender is not a predictor of success in problem solving for either
the Type 2 (p=1, 2-tailed Fisher’s exact test) or Type 3 (p=0.58, 2-tailed Fisher’s
exact test) insight problem (see Table 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016655.t001
Figure 1. An illustration of the insight problems used. Type 1
insight problems were used in the mental set phase. Type 2 and Type 3
problems were used in the testing phase.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016655.g001
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problems [31].
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room with no
distractions. Participants were told that we were investigating the
effect of brain stimulation on a matchstick problem solving task.
They were first given computerised instructions for the matchstick
task and a practice task of 3 Type 1 Problems (e.g. see figure 1)
composed of actual matchsticks on the table in front of them. The
experimenter demonstrated the correct solution if the participant
could not solve any practice item. Throughout the experiment,
participants were given a Roman numeral table from 1 to 15 and
actual matchsticks that they could use to help them reach the
solution.
During the mental set phase, participants were asked to solve a
series of 27 Type 1 problems presented one at a time via Microsoft
PowerPoint. The solutions for all of these problems involve
changing an ‘X’ to a ‘V’ by moving a stick. Participants had up to
2 minutes per problem and were asked to report the solution out
loud when they found it. They were given the solution during this
mental set phase if they could not solve the problem after 2
minutes.
After the mental set phase, participants were told that they
would receive 5 minutes of tDCS before being asked to solve a few
additional problems. They were also told that the stimulation
would continue until the end of the second (testing) phase. tDCS
was initiated after the mental set phase (solving the 27 Type 1
problems) and 5 minutes before initiating the testing phase because
cortical excitability changes induced by tDCS are not usually
observed until after a period of 3–5 minutes [10].
After the 5 minutes of tDCS, participants began the testing
phase when they were asked to solve 2 additional problems (the
Type 2 and Type 3 problems as shown in figure 1). During the
testing phase, participants were given up to 6 minutes for each of
the 2 test problems (the order of presentation was counterbal-
anced) and were not given the correct solutions if they failed.
Stimulation continued until the end of the testing phase (up to a
maximum of 17 minutes).
Statistical analysis
The primary dependent variable was the number of subjects
who could solve the most difficult insight problem (Type 2) during
the testing phase by the end of 360 seconds. We specifically
focused on results for the harder (Type 2) insight problem because
brain lesions have been shown to produce an advantage only for
these problems, not for the easier (Type 3) problems [32].
However, to replicate the experimental procedure of Ollinger et
al. [31], we also undertook an exploratory analysis of the results for
the Type 3 problem.
A two-tailed Fisher’s exact test was used to test the prediction
that those in the L2 R+ stimulation group would have a higher
success rate in solving the insight problems than those in the sham
stimulation group. In addition, a survival (time to event) analysis
was used to compare whether there was any difference in the time
to event curves between the L2 R+ group and the sham
stimulation group. Specifically, ‘‘event’’ is defined as solving the
insight problem (Type 2) during the testing phase. Time to event
curves (censored at 360 seconds) were plotted using the Kaplan-
Meier method and comparisons between the curves were analysed
using the logrank test [33].
In summary, Fisher’s exact test and the logrank test were used to
assess the prediction that those in the L2 R+ group would
perform better than those in the sham stimulation group. In
contrast, we did not have a hypothesis for those in the L+ R2
group, for several reasons (see Discussion), so the data for the L+
R2 group were subjected to exploratory analyses.
Results
Overall, condition of stimulation had a significant effect on the
time to event curves for both the Type 2 insight problem
(p=0.010, logrank test) and the Type 3 problem (p=0.037,
logrank test). Condition of stimulation also had a significant effect
on performance at the end of 6 minutes for both the Type 2
problem (p=0.024, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test) and the Type 3
problem (p=0.034, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test).
Our prediction, that those in the left cathodal/right anodal
group (L2 R+) would perform better than those in the sham
group, is strongly supported by the findings (p=0.008, logrank
test) (see figure 2). Only 20% of participants in the sham
stimulation (control) group solved the Type 2 (hardest) problem
(shown in figure 1) by the end of 6 minutes whereas, in contrast,
60% of participants solved it in the L2 R+ group (p=0.022, two-
tailed Fisher’s exact test). Similarly, only 45% of participants in the
sham stimulation (control) group solved the Type 3 (easier)
problem (shown in figure 1) by the end of 6 minutes whereas 85%
of participants who received L2 R+ stimulation solved it
(p=0.019, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test) (see figure 3).
Importantly, participants who received stimulation of the
opposite polarity (L+ R2) did not perform differently from those
in the sham group for either problem Type 2 (p=1, 2-tailed
Fisher’s exact test) or Type 3 (p=0.20, 2-tailed Fisher’s exact test)
at the end of six minutes. Similarly, there was no significant
difference in the time to event curves between the L+ R2 group
and the sham stimulation group for either the Type 2 (p=0.68,
logrank test) or the Type 3 (p=0.15, logrank test) insight problem.
Of the 60 participants included in the analysis, 57 of them
solved all 27 problems in the mental set phase successfully,
Figure 2. The figure provides a comparison of problem solving
performance (Type 2 insight problem) across stimulation
groups. Condition of stimulation has a significant effect on both the
time to event (solving the Type 2 insight problem) curves (p=0.010,
logrank test) and the percentage of subjects who solved the insight
problem by the end of 6 minutes (p=0.024, 2 tail fisher’s exact test).
While participants in all stimulation groups had difficulties in the first
minute, after 150 seconds, only those in the L2 R+ group continued to
solve the insight problem over time. By the end of 360 seconds, 60% of
those in the L2 R+ stimulation group could solve the problem whereas
only 20% of those in the sham stimulation group could do so (p=0.022,
two tail fisher’s exact test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016655.g002
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problems. The 3 participants who could not solve 1 or 2 problems
out of 27 Type 1 problems in the mental set phase were given the
solution to these problems after 2 minutes.
There is no evidence that the 3 groups of participants differ in
their problem solving abilities before tDCS (see Table 1) and most
of them, regardless of stimulation condition, had difficulties in the
first minute of the testing phase (see Figure 2). Furthermore, it
turned out that baseline characteristics were not predictors of
successful problem solving. In other words, those who solved the
Type 2 or Type 3 problem did not differ from those who could not
in age, gender, or experience in a quantitative field (See Table 2).
It might seem reasonable to suppose that faster performance in
the mental set phase might be associated with greater (or lesser)
success in the testing phase. For example, those who are faster
could either be better problem solvers in general or, conversely,
more stuck in the mental set. However, it turned that there was no
evidence (p=0.36, 2-tailed independent samples t test) that those
who successfully solved the insight problems during the testing
phase took a shorter time to complete the mental set phase.
Discussion
The prediction that those who received L2 R+ stimulation of
the anterior temporal lobes would be better able to solve insight
problems was strongly supported by the findings. Nevertheless, we
did not expect a three-fold increase in the likelihood of solving the
problems. This is the strongest cognitive enhancement we are
aware of for a brain stimulation study, but we suggest that the
results should be interpreted with certain limitations in mind.
Importantly, the kind of insight problem solving paradigm we
used (and, arguably, any insight problem solving) involves several
neural networks. Therefore, the pronounced improvement is most
likely due to a combination of several mechanisms. Candidate
mechanisms include diminishing a top-down (hypothesis driven)
cognitive style, interrupting the mental set, improving set-
switching ability, and facilitating insight directly. Even if we
assume that modulation of cortical excitability by tDCS was
constrained in areas strictly under the sponge electrodes (a
controversial issue [34]), it is likely that this modulation would
have an indirect impact on distant networks [35]. Consequently,
we cannot provide a definitive explanation, and can only offer
some possibilities regarding the mechanism of action leading to the
enhancement we observed.
Why tDCS improved insight?
Given our bilateral stimulation protocol, the improvement in
performance could be due to decreased cortical excitability of the
left hemisphere, increased excitability of the right hemisphere, or
some combination of both. In any case, the model of interhemi-
spheric rivalry [36,37,38,39], which provides the rationale for
many tDCS studies on stroke rehabilitation [40], predicts that
both left cathodal stimulation and right anodal stimulation would
have similar net effects on overall hemispheric balance. If this is
true, then both the L2 and R+ elements of our stimulation
protocol might contribute to diminishing left hemisphere domi-
nance, which is associated with stereotypy [20] and adherence to
existing hypotheses [21,23,26].
This possibility is consistent with evidence that the left
hemisphere is important for processing ‘‘well routinized
representations and strategies’’ and the right hemisphere is
‘‘critical for processing novel cognitive situations’’ [25]. Indeed,
there is evidence that those who are not strongly right handed
(associated with weaker left hemisphere dominance) are more
likely to update their existing mental representations [18,21]
and are less constrained by cognitive routine [24]. In other
words, by diminishing left hemisphere dominance (either by
L2,R +, or the combination of both), we might have increased
our subjects’ tendency to examine a problem anew instead of
through the mental templates of well-routinized representations
and strategies.
Figure 3. The figure provides a comparison of problem solving
performance (Type 3 insight problem) across stimulation
groups. We a priori did not intend to use the Type 3 insight problem
to test our main hypothesis that those in the L2 R+ group would
perform better than those in the sham stimulation group. This is
because those with brain lesion paradoxically perform better only for
Type 2 problems, but not for Type 3 problems (Reveberi et al., 2007).
Nevertheless, the result for the Type 3 problem is consistent with our
hypothesis and also consistent with results for the Type 2 problem.
Note that while the comparisons between L+ R2 and sham (p=0.15,
logrank test) and between L+ R2 and L2 R+ (p=0.26, logrank test) are
not significant (possibly due to the lack of power), it is clear that those
in the L2 R+ group had a significant advantage over those in the sham
stimulation group (p=0.010, logrank test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016655.g003
Table 2. Demographic characteristics of those who were
successful in solving the Type 2 problem vs those who failed.
Success Failure
Age (years) 21.760.69 22.960.94
Gender
Number of females 11 19
Number of males 10 20
Time required in completing the
mental set phase (seconds)
5996148 461673
Experience in a quantitative
field (number of participants)
Limited 7 7
Average 9 18
Significant 5 14
Values are presented as mean 6 standard error of the mean. Neither age
(p=0.255, 2 tailed independent t test), gender (p=1, 2-tailed Fisher’s exact
test), time required in completing the mental set phase (p=0.36, 2 tailed
independent t test), or experience in a quantitative field (p=0.36, 2-tailed
Fisher’s exact test) is a predictor of success in solving the Type 2 problem. In
other words, there is no evidence that those in the L2 R+ group had superior
performance because of confounding baseline attributes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016655.t002
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Alternatively, it is also possible that the pronounced improve-
ment in insight problem solving was due solely to inhibiting
(decreasing excitability of) the left ATL. This area is associated
with mental templates, or context [41,42,43,44] and inhibiting the
left ATL can lead to a less top down influenced (hypothesis driven)
cognitive style [9]. As an oversimplified caricature, by making our
participants’ cognitive style less hypothesis driven, less influenced
by existing mental templates or context, we might have increased
the chance that alternative representations, often hidden from
conscious awareness (for the sake of efficiency in dealing with the
familiar) are considered. Consistent with this view, Rausch [22]
found that patients with left temporal lobectomy (intact right
hemisphere) tended to switch hypotheses even when initial
hypotheses were explicitly shown to be correct. Based on the
evidence discussed above, the pronounced improvement in
problem solving was possibly a result of reducing the influence
of existing hypotheses, for example, reducing the impact of mental
set.
Paradoxical facilitation
Our findings are also consistent with evidence that paradoxical
functional facilitation [45], such as the emergence of perceptual
skills related to a less top-down cognitive style, can occur because
of brain dysfunction [8,9,46,47], or inhibition of the left ATL
[15,16,17]. Consistent with this possibility, Reverberi et al. [32],
using the same matchstick paradigm, demonstrated that while only
43% of healthy participants can solve the Type 2 insight problem
shown in figure 1, paradoxically, 82% of patients with lesions in
the lateral frontal area can do so. Such results are consistent with
the view that tradeoffs or competition amongst different neural
networks are common in human cognition [48,49]. They are also
consistent with the possibility that brain stimulation could
modulate this tradeoff to our advantage (in certain situations) by
temporarily inhibiting or disinhibiting certain brain regions. It would
be interesting in further studies to explore whether inhibiting the
lateral frontal lobe and the left ATL simultaneously by non-
invasive brain stimulation would lead to an even stronger effect in
improved insight problem solving.
Increased excitability of the right ATL
Of course, it is possible that the pronounced improvement is
simply due to increased excitability in the right ATL, an area
associated with novel meaning [14] and insight [12,13]. In other
words, the improvement we found might be directly due to
facilitating the area associated with insight rather than reducing
any mental set effect. Alternatively, it is possible that tDCS can
only reduce the mental set effect, but cannot facilitate insight in
general. Further studies using a variety of control tasks are needed
to disentangle the specific mechanisms of action and to determine
whether the improvement in insight problem solving is task
specific or can be widely generalized.
Stimulation with the opposite polarity (L+ R2)
One might have anticipated (from the logic of hemispheric
rivalry, discussed above) that those who received stimulation of the
opposite polarity (L+ R2) would have performed worse than those
in the sham condition. However, this was not the case for either
problem in the testing phase. A possible explanation is that there
might be a ceiling effect in that brain stimulation cannot make
someone more left hemisphere dominant, more constrained by
mental set, than they already are. This possibility is consistent with
evidence that brain stimulation can improve the motor skills of
people’s non-dominant hand by decreasing excitability to the
dominant motor cortex, but cannot improve people’s dominant
hand by increasing excitability to the dominant motor cortex [50].
Furthermore, the effect of cortical stimulation on excitability is
argued to be dependent on the resting state of neurons such that
stimulation might preferentially modulate less active neural
networks [51]. Therefore, although cathodal stimulation, on
average, will lead to decreased excitability in the stimulated region
(and vice versa for anodal stimulation), it is possible that for 10–
20% of the subjects, the opposite effect on cortical excitability
would occur during the testing phase [51,52]. Nevertheless, our
results suggest strong hemispheric differences in that only those
who received L2 R+ stimulation showed an improvement. It is
not the case that simply stimulating any brain region can improve
performance by disrupting the normal state of mind.
Limitations
As mentioned earlier, the focality of tDCS is still a controversial
issue [53] and there might not be a one to one relationship
between changes in cortical excitability under the electrodes and
changes in brain functions [34]. On one hand, several studies
modulating various brain regions have shown that the behavioural
effects of tDCS are relatively focal and can lead to cognitive
enhancement. For example, tDCS applied to frontal areas has
been shown to improve memory [54,55], planning [56]and
complex associative thought [57], whereas tDCS applied to the
parietal areas and posterior perisylvian region have led to
improved visual spatial attention [36]and language acquisition
[58], respectively. On the other hand, modeling studies demon-
strate that there is most likely substantial current dispersion under
the electrodes, especially at the cerebrospinal fluid level, where the
conductance is particularly high [34,53]. If this was the case, then
the cognitive enhancement we found would be more likely a result
of reducing left hemisphere dominance more globally rather than
inhibiting the ATL specifically.
Furthermore, we are not able to disentangle the effect of left
cathodal stimulation and right anodal stimulation in isolation to
discover which has a stronger effect. We specifically used a
bilateral stimulation montage with opposite polarities, which is the
most efficient design for testing the primary question that tDCS
can improve insight problem solving in healthy people. It also
reduces the likelihood of current dispersion since unilateral
stimulation (with a large monopolar electrode) by definition has
a shorter distance between the electrodes and thus a higher
likelihood of current shunting along the scalp [59]. Further studies
might address this question with unilateral stimulation in
combination with neurophysiological imaging before, during and
after stimulation.
Conclusions
Our predisposition to use contextual cues from past experience
confers a clear evolutionary advantage in rapidly dealing with the
familiar, but this can lead to the mental set effect or over-
generalisation. As John Maynard Keynes [60] noted, ‘‘The
difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old
ones, which ramify…into every corner of our mind.’’ Our findings
suggest the possibility that brain stimulation can be used to
modulate this tradeoff to our advantage in a specific situation,
possibly by temporarily making our cognitive style less top-down
influenced (hypothesis driven). For example, brain stimulation
might allow a person to examine a problem anew instead of
through the mental templates of what is already known. Further
brain stimulation studies in combination with neurophysiological
imaging and a variety of control tasks are needed to determine the
Facilitate Insight by Brain Stimulation
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the pronounced cognitive enhancement we found is generalizable
to other tasks.
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